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Abstract 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008 European authorities have set out to strengthen 
financial governance in order to create a more stable and resilient financial system. As 
discussed in this paper, the new and updated EU legislation addressed at a wide array of 
financial markets and institutions also significantly broadened the scope of the existing 
preferential regulatory treatment of sovereign bonds and introduced new funding privileges 
for governments. The many regulatory incentives for investors to buy and hold (domestic) 
government debt facilitate public debt management, at the cost of crowding out private sector 
funding and raising financial stability concerns every time the government faces distress. 
Moreover, a privileged access to capital markets reduces market discipline and may lead to 
moral hazard on the part of sovereigns. The growing scope of these government funding 
privileges in EU financial law may be interpreted in three (complementary) ways: as a revival 
of financial repression in a modern prudential guise to reduce the burden of high public debt, 
as a return to the traditional close relationship between the government and the financial 
sector so as to align mutual interests in fiscal and financial stability, or as a way to increase 
explicit and implicit taxes on finance and recoup public revenues lost during the financial 
crisis. The preferential treatment of sovereign exposures and governments’ market access is 
found in a growing body of EU financial law. Regulatory efforts to reduce it would have to 
be coordinated at the international level, take account of the financial structure and allow for 
a (long) period of transition to avoid market disruption. 
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[T]he current prudential treatment of sovereign exposures is no longer tenable … prudential 
regulation is a useful complement to sound public finances, but not a substitute for them.  
BIS (2016), 86th Annual Report 2015/16, pp.92-93. 
1. Introduction 
Responding to the global financial crisis of 2008, the leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) 
major economies, including the European Union (EU), committed to restoring the health and 
stability of the global financial system (Group of Twenty, 2008). They responded by 
tightening regulations, stepping up supervision and putting in place more effective bank 
resolution regimes and took steps to counter excessive speculation and irrational market 
forces.  
Following the G20 initiatives, the competent authorities in the EU set out to correct financial 
market failures, tighten financial regulation, enhance financial supervision and improve the 
resilience of financial institutions in Europe. The European Commission (2010a, 2014b) 
implemented a comprehensive financial reform programme with the overall objective to 
create a more resilient and growth-supportive EU financial system and to secure financial 
stability. This supranational intervention may be viewed as a public policy response to 
legitimate growth, stability and distributional concerns associated with market, institutional 
and regulatory failures. As discussed in the paper, the reform of European finance went 
further than just removing financial market distortions, correcting deficient regulations and 
strengthening supervisory institutions: it also significantly widened the scope of the existing 
preferential regulatory treatment of sovereign debt that makes it easier for governments to 
obtain market funding at favourable interest rates and to manage the crisis legacy of high 
public debt. The broadening base of this ‘regulatory tax on finance’ has largely escaped 
attention. 
First, the authorities have set out to tighten EU prudential legislation for banks as well as for 
money market funds, investment funds, institutional investors and central counterparties. As a 
result, the existing preferential treatment of claims on the government in banking legislation 
has gained in weight and has been extended to other financial services. This regulatory 
feature encourages the financial industry to disregard the risks from high government 
exposures and contributes to captive sovereign credit markets. Second, EU financial market 
legislation has been tightened in several respects, notably affecting credit rating agencies, 
short-selling and credit default swaps. Several aspects of these legal changes reduce market 
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pressure and benefit governments in times of funding stress. Third, many euro area countries 
are considering how best to impose a harmonised financial transactions tax. Governments 
could well decide to exempt market trading in sovereign bonds, thereby favouring public debt 
management in addition to receiving extra tax revenues.  
European policymakers may have felt compelled in this respect to follow where relevant 
parallel regulatory developments in other advanced economies, notably the United States. 
Beyond this political desire for a ‘level playing field’, the extension of market access support 
for governments in EU law may be related to three (complementary) political economy 
explanations.  
First, this finding could signal the revival of ‘financial repression’, i.e. a comprehensive 
regime of government interventions in the financial system with the intention to extract 
economic rents and to gain fiscal benefits (Reinhart, 2012; van Riet, 2013). A common 
feature of financially repressed systems is that government bond prices are distorted by non-
market players and regulation (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Lorenzen (2012, p.3) also sees a 
“distinct leaning in recent policy towards gradually creating a captive buyer base that can 
hold more of sovereign debt through voluntary or coercive means”. This political dominance 
over finance to facilitate government funding may create a bias towards debt-financed public 
spending.  
Second, the new government funding privileges in finance could reflect the need to redefine 
the existing relationship between the state and the financial sector. Monnet et al. (2014) 
interpret the additional restraints placed on the financial industry as a return to historical 
patterns, whereby governments and market participants exercise mutual pressure and try to 
influence each other in order to gain special advantages. The stronger role of the state in 
finance is necessary in order to stabilise public finances in a more volatile financial market 
environment, in the interest of all players in this political game. Taking this view, a 
preferential regulatory treatment of public sector versus private sector debt securities reflects 
the importance of preserving the role of government bonds as safe and liquid assets as a 
precondition for a stable financial system.  
Third, the introduction of new explicit and implicit taxes on finance may respond to the 
perception that governments were under the influence of regulatory capture by the financial 
industry and political pressure from banking sector lobbies to reduce their fiscal and quasi-
fiscal burden. This enabled leveraged international banks to enjoy large profits, while the 
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crisis costs of bank resolution were socialised. For reasons of tax fairness, the financial sector 
should return this government support and in future make a larger contribution to public 
revenues and resolution funds (see IMF, 2010; ESRB, 2012, 2014; Chaudry et al., 2015; 
Devereux et al., 2015). Moreover, financial markets and services could serve as a vehicle for 
increased implicit taxation of the private non-financial sector. To ensure the effectiveness of 
the related financial sector taxes and to prevent tax arbitrage in a setting with open capital 
markets, they should be introduced at the European level.  
Enabling governments to protect themselves from market pressure may be understandable 
given the heavy fiscal legacy of the crisis, the systemic role of government bonds as safe and 
liquid assets and the view that the financial sector should in future make a larger contribution 
to the European tax bill. This may offer national governments some compensation for the fact 
that their ability to exercise political dominance over the domestic financial industry and 
capital markets in general is being constrained by two recent developments: first, the recent 
centralisation of banking supervision and resolution under the European Banking Union, and 
second, the planned harmonisation of capital market law as part of a Capital Markets Union 
(Véron, 2012; 2014).    
However, extensive government privileges in public debt financing create moral hazard on 
the part of sovereigns and undermine incentives for fiscal adjustment and economic reforms. 
They put a heavy burden on the successful implementation of the reinforced EU economic 
governance framework that seeks to ensure sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies (see 
Koester et al., 2012; Kamps et al., 2014). Moreover, the regulatory bias towards large 
sovereign exposures in financial institutions may become an economic and prudential 
concern, given the possible crowding out of private sector funding and the risks for financial 
stability in times of fiscal stress (see also ESRB, 2015). At the international and European 
level discussions are currently ongoing on whether, how and in what pace to phase out these 
provisions in prudential banking legislation. The evidence in this paper shows that an 
encompassing approach is warranted, taking account of the risk of regulatory arbitrage. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the post-war changes in the 
governance of finance in Europe. EU countries opened up financial markets, introduced 
common prudential legislation to supervise the financial industry, and became more 
dependent on capital markets for their funding needs. Section 3, 4 and 5 document the main 
cases where the crisis-driven overhaul of European financial governance over the period 
2008-2016 is leading to a (further) preferential treatment of sovereign debt in banking, 
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investment and market law, respectively.1 While the result is a fairly extensive overview of 
government funding privileges appearing in (proposals for) EU regulations and directives, the 
paper concurs with Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015, p. 322) that such a “list is barely the tip of 
the iceberg, as volumes would be required to fully capture all that has been turned into law – 
let alone what has been and continues to be discussed”.2 Section 6 concludes that the 
financial reforms undertaken are vital in order to make European finance more resilient and 
less prone to adverse shocks, but that the growing number of government funding privileges 
may fuel moral hazard on the part of sovereigns. 
2. Changes in the governance of finance in Europe 
The first decades after World War II saw many advanced economies, also in Europe, 
applying pervasive financial restrictions. The rationale for such government interventions 
was the perception that policy-makers could not rely on the free functioning of financial 
markets to achieve public policy objectives (van Riet, 2016a). Moreover, it helped 
governments in managing and reducing their very high post-war public debt ratios (Reinhart 
and Sbrancia, 2015). However, the public sector interventions distorted private saving and 
investment decisions, hampered the efficiency of financial intermediation and triggered 
evasive action to escape the implicit taxation and diversion of private returns.  
After the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods exchange rate system, it became ever-more 
difficult to maintain the pervasive restrictions on the financial system. Over the course of the 
1970s-1980s, financial markets in advanced economies were widely liberalised, capital 
controls were progressively lifted, central banks gained legal independence in the conduct of 
monetary policy and public debt management was often operationally separated from fiscal 
and monetary policy. On the European continent this process mostly occurred at a relatively 
late stage, in preparation of the changeover to the euro (Wyplosz, 2001). 
This evolving trend had at least two consequences for governments: first, they had to 
introduce prudential regulation and supervision of the financial sector to protect savers and 
                                                          
1  This review focuses on regulatory privileges for EU sovereigns (central governments) while it acknowledges that in 
many cases similar advantages apply to the central bank, regional and local governments, public sector entities, 
multilateral institutions and third country governments. Moreover, many EU financial laws are of relevance for the 
whole European Economic Area.    
2  For example, EU directives also make it possible to grant European sovereign debtors specific privileges with regard to 
the initial public offering of their securities, disclosure requirements for listed securities and the preservation of market 
integrity. These EU provisions allow Member States in particular to exempt sovereigns from the obligation to publish a 
prospectus and from regular financial reporting requirements, and to exempt public debt management transactions from 
the rules against insider dealing and market manipulation. These sovereign privileges are discussed by Kersting (2012) 
and not covered in this study. 
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investors and preserve systemic stability (Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2013); second, they had 
to pursue credible stability-oriented economic policies in order to convince market 
participants that they were creditworthy so that they could attract savings at affordable, 
market-determined (real) interest rates (van Riet, 2013).  
Gelpern and Gerding (2016) observe in this light that the law plays an important role in 
making investors believe that specific assets are safe. Beyond the core powers of a nation 
state to access the country’s resources, national policymakers use their powers of legislation, 
regulation and contract design to coordinate market participants towards selecting the 
sovereign benchmark asset promoted by law and to act as if it was safe, even if reality is 
different. Governments greatly facilitated meeting their new challenge of financing public 
debt in open capital markets by making sure that the prudential requirements for financial 
intermediaries, notably banks and institutional investors, would not impose any restrictions 
on their holdings of domestic sovereign debt. Accordingly, they labelled government bonds 
as ‘safe’ for regulatory purposes.  
Also supported by favourable credit ratings and the absence of defaults, markets thus 
generally perceived the sovereign bonds of advanced economies as ‘safe’ assets and over 
time these functioned as a cornerstone for the development of the financial system (IMF, 
2012; Castro and Mencía, 2014; van Riet, 2016b). As a ‘risk free’ financial instrument they 
served inter alia as a high-quality liquid asset on bank balance sheets for meeting prudential 
standards, a stable store of value for institutional investors, a reliable form of collateral in 
repurchase and derivatives markets as well as for central bank refinancing operations and 
payment and settlement systems, and as a benchmark for pricing private sector securities. The 
growth of government bond markets in fact underpinned the rapid global expansion of 
financial markets and financial institutions in recent decades, with international regulatory 
coordination and supervisory cooperation struggling to keep pace.    
After the global financial crisis of September 2008 many observers have argued that financial 
liberalisation had made the financial sector more prone to risk-taking behaviour, blaming 
light-touch regulation and lax supervision for accommodating the growing fragilities in the 
financial system. As stated by the European Commission (2014b, p.3) “[p]olicymakers, 
regulators and supervisors around the world failed to identify and adequately address the 
risks building up in the financial system”. Arguably, supervisory agencies were subject to 
regulatory capture by the financial industry and eschewed precautionary action. A 
combination of market failures, regulatory deficiencies and supervisory forbearance enabled 
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international banks to take on too much leverage and the private non-financial sector in many 
countries to accumulate an unsustainable mountain of debt. Moreover, ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
systemic banks took too many risks in their hunt for higher yields and still many of them 
succeeded in passing their rescue bill on to taxpayers (IMF, 2014).    
This motivated a newly empowered G20 to strengthen financial markets and remedy the 
shortcoming of regulatory regimes so as to avoid future crises. At the Washington Summit of 
15 November 2008, the leaders of the G20 established common principles for the reform of 
financial markets and an action plan (Group of Twenty, 2008). Following the G20 initiatives, 
the competent authorities in the EU set out to correct financial market failures, tighten 
financial regulation, enhance financial supervision and improve the resilience of credit 
institutions in Europe. The European Commission (2010a, 2012, 2014b) embarked on a 
comprehensive financial reform programme with the aim to make the financial sector “more 
stable, more responsible, less speculative and less short-termist, and more oriented towards 
long-term growth” (European Commission, 2012, p.23). The overall objective of this 
overhaul of the governance of finance in Europe is to create a more resilient and growth-
supportive EU financial system and to secure financial stability. However, this 
comprehensive policy response also significantly broadened the scope of the existing 
preferential regulatory treatment of sovereign bonds.  
To highlight the evolution over time, van Riet (2015) constructs composite legal indices, 
covering the preferential treatment of sovereign debt in new EU financial legislation 
introduced over the period 2008 to 2015. He finds that the array of regulatory favours for 
euro area governments in European finance has increased significantly, in particular for euro 
area countries. A further rise will occur when already adopted and still pending EU 
legislation takes effect, before it peaks in 2018 and then declines slightly due to a modest 
scaling back of these fiscal favours.    
Looking beyond the wish to coordinate financial reforms at the global level, this remarkable 
development may reflect at least three (complementary) political economy considerations.  
First, the wider reach of government funding privileges can be interpreted as a financial 
repression strategy to facilitate public debt management. One may argue that the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (henceforth: ‘EU Treaty’) offers little scope for a 
revival of market access support for governments, given that the prevailing ‘fiscal rules of the 
game’ force them to finance public debt in open capital markets and hence subject them to 
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market discipline. Moreover, the establishment of the European Banking Union with its 
centralised banking supervision and resolution mechanisms has taken away many of their 
domestic levers for financial repression (Véron, 2012). Europe’s plans for a Capital Markets 
Union entail a similar threat to the ability of national authorities to repress domestic capital 
markets and the non-bank financial sector (Véron, 2014). However, the quest for a more 
resilient financial system may still contribute to ring-fencing governments against market 
pressure. The associated market distortions may find acceptance, notably under the guise of 
changing EU prudential legislation (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). 3 Taken together, this could 
signal that in conjunction with the crisis response a modern supranational form of financial 
repression is resurfacing with the objective to ease the burden of high public debt. 
Second, governments may be seeking to restore a mutually beneficial relationship between 
the public sector and the financial sector. Monnet et al. (2014) point to the rising share of 
sovereign bonds on the balance sheets of financial institutions, the growing importance of 
public credit institutions in providing long-term financing to the economy, and the active role 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) in preserving both monetary and financial stability. 
They interpret this changing financial landscape as a reactivation of the multi-faceted 
interactions between governments and their financial systems that were predominant until the 
1980s; these served, inter alia, to facilitate economic adjustment and maintain financial 
stability. Against this background, preserving the benchmark role of government bonds as 
safe and liquid assets may be seen as vital to the stability of the financial system.  
Third, for reasons of tax fairness, the financial sector could be expected to make a larger 
contribution to public revenues. As pointed out by Huizinga (2004), EU countries in the past 
have tended to subsidise domestic banks using tax, regulatory and supervisory instruments to 
offer them a relief from the high explicit and implicit levels of taxation in economies with a 
repressed financial system. This balance was disturbed as the liberalisation of the European 
banking sector and the introduction of the euro forced governments to reduce the net fiscal 
and quasi-fiscal burden on domestic banks facing heightened international competition to an 
unduly low level. The strong policy competition among Member States resulted in extensive 
tax and cost benefits, light-touch regulation and lax supervision. Responding to the financial 
                                                          
3  The EU Treaty (Article 124) explicitly states that “[a]ny measure, not based on prudential considerations, establishing 
privileged access by Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public 
authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial institutions, shall 
be prohibited”. Council Regulation (EC) No 3604/93 further specifies: “Whereas … prudential considerations may 
justify departure from the principle of this prohibition; … laws, regulations or administrative actions may not, however, 
under the cover of prudential considerations, be used to establish disguised privileged access”. 
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crisis European governments not only seek to redress apparent market, institutional and 
regulatory failures; they also wish to recoup foregone tax revenues and cut implicit subsidies 
by introducing financial sector taxes and removing quasi-fiscal advantages in financial 
legislation.  
The freedom of financial markets and institutions will in any case be more constrained in the 
future than before the crisis. As discussed in detail below, a significant number of the 
financial reforms undertaken at the European level to prevent a repetition of the financial 
crisis also show a tendency towards facilitating capital market access and debt financing for 
the public sector (see Table 1 for the 10 main legislative measures of 2008-2016 selected for 
this paper; see Annex Table for a detailed overview).  
Table 1 – Selection of main European financial reforms 2008-2016 
Main reforms of EU financial legislation  
 
De facto date of 
announcement 
De jure date of     
application 
Status of legislative 
process  
  1. EU banking regulation/directive (CRR/CRD IV) July 2011 Jan 2014 In force, phased in 
      EBA capital exercise Oct 2011 Oct 2011 Ad hoc measure, 
repealed Dec 2014  
  2. EU banking structure regulation Jan 2014 Jan 2017/ 
Jan 2018 
Under discussion 
  3. EU regulation on money market funds Sept 2013 Jan 2017 Under discussion 
  4. EU investment funds directive (UCITS IV) July 2008 July 2011 In force 
  5. EU insurance and reinsurance directive (Solvency II) Mar 2008 Jan 2016 In force 
  6. EU directive for occupational pension funds (IORP II)  July 2010 - Deferred in May 2013 
  7. EU market infrastructure regulation (EMIR) Sept 2010 Aug 2012 In force  
  8. EU regulation on credit rating agencies  July 2011 June 2013 In force 
  9. EU regulation on short-selling and CDS contracts  Sept 2010 Nov 2012 In force 
10. Common financial transactions tax (FTT) Feb 2013 Dec 2016 Under discussion 
Source: Compilation based on (proposed) changes in European financial law 2008-2016.      
3. The preferential treatment of government debt in EU banking law 
3.1 EU prudential banking legislation 
A privileged market access for governments based on prudential considerations can be found 
already in the Basel Accord of 1988. This agreement among the Group of Ten (G10) major 
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economies determined the supervisory regulations governing the capital adequacy of 
international banks based on the weighted relative riskiness of broad categories of assets, 
focusing on credit risk. One of the contentious issues was how to treat bank claims on foreign 
governments relative to those on the domestic government which were deemed to be ‘safe’.4 
As documented by Goodhart (2011, p.154; 2013, p.243), Europe insisted to apply the basic 
principle of the EU Treaty that all Member States should be treated equally and enjoy the 
same high credit standing, which should translate in a zero credit risk for bank claims on all 
EU sovereigns. To allow for an equal assessment of sovereign instruments among the ‘club’ 
of G10 members and other advanced economies, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision then decided to extend the preferential treatment of sovereign exposures by 
default to those vis-à-vis all OECD countries.5 As observed by Goodhart (2011, p.159) true 
economic risk played no role in this decision, but it was the only way to reach an agreement 
on the subject.  
The revised framework of Basel II introduced a significantly more risk-sensitive framework 
based on two credit rating approaches: a standardised one and another based on banks’ 
internal risk models. OECD membership was thus no longer a sufficient condition for 
sovereign claims to attract a zero risk weight. However, national authorities were given the 
choice to give bank claims on the sovereign a preferential zero-risk treatment if certain 
conditions were met. 
At the European level, the Basel Accords I and II found their way in successive versions of 
the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), which were transposed into national law of the 
Member States for supervisory application to credit institutions and investment firms. These 
EU directives essentially considered government securities as ‘safe’ assets by definition, 
irrespective of credit, market and concentration risks (Kopf, 2011).   
For banks located in a euro area country the changeover to the euro in 1999 implied a 
substantial increase in the effective scope of the preferential regulatory treatment of sovereign 
exposures. Before 1999, their focus was on holding own government bonds because 
exchange rate risk still acted as a barrier to their cross-border investments in debt securities 
                                                          
4  The idea was that a sovereign can always meet its nominal payment obligations by issuing more of its own currency. 
This argument raised questions for those countries where the central bank was independent and later for the member 
governments of the euro area where debt monetisation by the ECB was excluded by law. See also BIS (2016, p.90).       
5  More precisely: all full OECD members or countries which had concluded special lending arrangements with the IMF 
associated with the Funds’ General Arrangements to Borrow (the club was subsequently extended to include those 
countries having signed the New Arrangements to Borrow). Later it was added that any country which reschedules its 
official external debt is precluded from this group for a period of five years. For details see Goodhart (2011, Chapter 6).     
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issued by other prospective euro area central governments – even though central government 
debt from all OECD members attracted a zero-risk weight. After the inception of the euro, 
these banks could buy the central government bonds of other countries in the eurozone not 
only without having to worry about extra capital charges for lower-rated sovereigns but also 
without having to accept exchange rate risk. As their claims on individual governments were 
furthermore exempted from the large exposure limit that applied to private assets, they 
enjoyed a regulatory incentive to diversify their country risk and ‘hunt for yield’ across the 
whole eurozone (see also McCauley and White, 1997).  
Following the global financial crisis, tighter Basel III standards were approved by the G20 in 
November 2010 and published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision one month 
later. The EU Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and update IV of the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV) transposed these new international standards into EU law; 
they entered into force in July 2013 and took gradual effect from January 2014 with full 
implementation to be achieved within five years (European Union, 2013c,d). Their overall 
aim is to strengthen the quantity and quality of bank capital, limit large capital exposures, 
ensure liquidity, promote stable funding and constrain leverage. This revamped EU 
prudential banking legislation contains several important cases of a preferential treatment of 
bank claims on the government, some of which will be limited over time while some others 
are additional compared to those in the earlier CRDs. 
Capital adequacy 
According to the Basel II and III agreements, banks must hold a minimum amount of capital 
against the credit risk of all their exposures in the banking book, including their sovereign 
exposures. Two methodologies may be adopted: the standardised approach, which relies on 
external credit ratings; and the internal-rating based approach, which relies on (large) banks’ 
own risk assessment models. Under the standardised approach of the Basel II/III framework 
national authorities have the discretion to allow banks to apply reduced risk weights to their 
sovereign exposures (see BIS, 2013). 6  
The new EU regulation (CRR) grants, as before, a standardised zero-risk weight to exposures 
vis-à-vis the central government of any Member State if these are denominated and funded in 
                                                          
6  Note that sovereign claims held in the trading book also receive a reduced risk weight for specific market risks, notably 
for credit spread risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has undertaken a fundamental review of the capital 
requirements for securities held in the trading book. The new standards on the treatment of market risk in the trading 
book take effect from January 2019 and continue to allow banks to give a preferential treatment to sovereign exposures. 
The European Commission (2016) has put forward similar trading book rules for EU credit institutions, assigning 
exposures to all EU sovereigns always the lowest risk weights for credit spread risk. 
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the domestic currency. For banks in the eurozone, this preferential treatment covers by 
default their claims on all member countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) if these are denominated and funded in the euro, since this is their relevant domestic 
currency. The standardised approach, as applied in the EU, also continues to extend the zero-
risk weight to all EU sovereign exposures denominated and funded in any other EU currency 
than that of the issuing Member State, although after 2017 this transitional provision will be 
phased out. From 2020 onwards in these cases the assessment of external credit rating 
agencies will have to be followed (see Tables 2 and 3).  
Table 2 – Credit risk weights for exposures to central governments  
(standardised approach; ratings from nominated external credit assessment institutions) 
 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 unrated 
 External credit rating 
 (example S&P) 
AAA, 
AA 
A BBB BB B CCC and 
below 
unrated 
 Credit risk weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
Source: Final draft implementation technical standard prepared by EBA, EIOPA and ESMA (November 2015) 
between the long-term issuer credit assessments of Standard & Poor’s and the credit quality steps under the 
standardised approach in line with the EU Capital Requirements Regulation, Articles 114 and 136 (European 
Union, 2013c). 
Table 3 - Regulatory capital treatment of bank claims on the government 1)       
(EU prudential banking legislation - CRR/CRD IV; in percent of standard credit rating)       
 
Note 1): claims on EU governments include claims on central government and the central bank and may include 
claims on regional and local governments and in exceptional circumstance those on public sector entities. 
Note 2): 0% on condition that the regulatory authorities have at least equivalent prudential legislation in place 
and give claims on their sovereign issued and funded in domestic currency a risk weight of zero; otherwise 
standard credit rating. 
Claims issued and funded in: domestic currency other EU currency
Year of application: permanent 2014-17 2018 2019 2020
Claims issued by: 
domestic government of a euro area country 0% 0% 20% 50% 100%
government of any other euro area country 0% 0% 20% 50% 100%
government of any other non-euro area EU country 0% 0% 20% 50% 100%
government of any non-EU country 2) 0%
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For euro area banks this forthcoming more realistic risk weighting of sovereign claims in 
non-domestic EU currencies is only of modest relevance; as mentioned above, banks based in 
the eurozone can automatically value all their euro denominated and funded exposures vis-à-
vis EMU governments as zero risk claims (see also Angelini et al., 2014). This implies that 
for example the sovereign bonds issued by crisis-affected eurozone countries will continue to 
be treated as risk-free for all euro area banks. Goodhart (2013, p.244) critically describes this 
outcome as “patently ludicrous” (see also the views of Pomerleano, 2010; Kassow, 2010; 
Kopf, 2011; Ayadi et al. 2012; Nouy, 2012; Gros, 2013; Weidmann, 2013). 
The Basel II/III framework allows banks using internal risk models to permanently adopt the 
standardised approach for assessing credit risk for non-significant business units and asset 
classes that are immaterial in terms of size and perceived risk profile. Going beyond this 
Basel II/III ‘carve out’, the EU regulation (CRR) permits such banks to apply the 
standardised approach to a wide range of sovereign exposures (covering the whole public 
sector of the Member States) – even those of material size and perceived risk – as long as 
they would be assigned a standardised zero-risk weight (see Nouy, 2012; BIS, 2013; Castro 
and Mencía, 2014; ESRB, 2015 on this so-called ‘permanent partial use’ of internal credit 
ratings). The EBA is required to issue guidelines at the latest in 2018 that limit over time the 
use of the standardised approach by banks that normally use internal ratings. 
Overall, the zero-risk assessment applicable to all sovereign exposures in EU prudential 
banking regulation continues to be misaligned with the more differentiated views of markets 
and credit rating agencies regarding Member States’ fiscal fundamentals and their probability 
of default. This amounts to a preferential regulatory treatment of bank claims on the public 
sector relative to exposures vis-à-vis the private sector, which benefits in particular euro area 
governments. Since the EU bank capital requirements have been tightened with the 
implementation of Basel III, in terms of the capital definition, the capital criteria and five 
extra capital buffers for specific situations, the weight of this preferential treatment has 
increased even further. All else equal, this should be expected to further raise banks’ 
structural demand for these ‘safe’ sovereign assets. 
According to the IMF (2012), the zero-risk weighting of domestic sovereign exposures 
contributed to an upward bias in the end-2007 capital adequacy ratios of banks (in terms of 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets) of 0.5 to 2.0 percentage points across European 
countries. This zero-risk regulatory bias has grown since the financial crisis, because fiscal 
fundamentals have deteriorated and many banks have increased their sovereign exposures. 
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Bonner (2016) shows the presence of this regulatory effect in a study of the Dutch banking 
sector over the period June 2009 to December 2012. Banks with a lower regulatory capital 
position significantly increased their demand for zero risk-weighted sovereign bonds shortly 
before the reporting date over and above their internal risk management targets while selling 
other, positive risk-weighted bonds. Korte and Steffen (2014; 2015) conclude that banks face 
a large contingent capital shortage due to the zero-risk treatment of their sovereign exposure, 
which increases potential public bailout costs, amplifies the negative sovereign-bank 
feedback loop and – through their holdings of non-domestic government bonds – fuels 
contagion across Europe. They estimate the size of this sovereign subsidy for 54 large 
European banks at EUR 750 bn. or almost 100% of their core (tier 1) capital as of June 2013, 
a figure which has almost doubled since end-2009 as actual credit risks on government debt 
deteriorated substantially.  
Hannoun (2011) suggests that the regulatory authorities should move towards a more realistic 
assessment of sovereign risk and stricter capital requirements where necessary. Consistent 
with this advice, the European Banking Authority (EBA) issued in December 2011 a 
recommendation to the national competent authorities which sought to increase the 
transparency about unrealised losses hidden in the government bond portfolios of systemic 
banks. Large European banks were asked to create by mid-2012 an exceptional and 
temporary capital buffer against their fair valued sovereign exposures towards the countries 
belonging to the European Economic Area (EEA) and to raise in this connection their core 
tier 1 capital ratio to 9%. The EBA’s capital exercise may be interpreted as de facto 
introducing realistic risk weights on the sovereign exposures of the participating large banks 
(Korte and Steffen, 2014; 2015). This prudential intervention sought to reassure markets 
about the banking sector’s ability to absorb unexpected losses and remain solvent. National 
supervisors were in this connection asked to ensure that the necessary strengthening of banks’ 
capital positions would not lead to an excessive pace of deleveraging, as this could aggravate 
the recession in affected countries. This could occur if in response to the capital exercise 
banks would sell a lot of their government bonds and/or significantly reduce the supply of 
credit to the economy.  
Most large banks were able to fulfil the EBA’s temporary capital requirements by mid-2012 
(EBA, 2012). As a transition to the full implementation of the Basel III capital standards in 
EU law (CRR/CRD IV), the EBA adopted in July 2013 a new recommendation to preserve 
the enhanced level of bank capital. Also taking account of the market environment, the 
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additional capital buffer against sovereign risk thus remained in force, until the EBA 
recommendation was repealed in December 2014.  
Liquidity coverage ratio 
The misalignment between regulatory and market-based sovereign credit risk in the EU’s 
capital adequacy rules has been extended to the new EU liquidity and funding standards that 
follow the Basel III framework as published in December 2010 (see Nouy, 2012; Castro and 
Mencia, 2014; ESRB, 2015). Starting with liquidity, the CRR requires credit institutions and 
investment firms to hold enough unencumbered high-quality liquid transferable assets to 
cover their net cash outflows over a 30-day period of liquidity stress. Observance of this 
liquidity coverage ratio should increase the short-term resilience of banks against shocks that 
drain their liquidity.  
A liquid asset is defined as “a freely transferable asset that can be converted quickly into cash 
in private markets within a short timeframe and without significant loss in value” (see 
European Union, 2015a, p.2). For certain types of liquid assets the market value used in the 
calculation of the liquidity coverage ratio is to be reduced by a specific haircut. A further 
differentiation is made between assets of extremely high liquidity and credit quality (so-
called level 1 assets) and assets of high liquidity and credit quality (level 2 assets, which are 
further divided in level 2A and 2B). Pending specification of a uniform definition, the CRR 
stated that “at least government bonds … would be expected to be considered assets of 
extremely high liquidity and credit quality” (European Union, 2013c, p.13).  
The EBA (2013) conducted an empirical analysis to compile a ranking of different asset 
classes according to their liquidity. EU sovereign bonds issued in the domestic currency and 
with the highest credit quality (step 1 in Table 2 above) were indeed found to meet the 
criteria of assets of extremely high liquidity and credit quality. But sovereign bonds of a 
lower credit quality (step 2 in Table 2) only fulfilled the criteria of assets of high liquidity and 
credit quality. Adding its qualitative expert judgement, the EBA nevertheless recommended 
an equal treatment of all bonds issued or guaranteed by EU sovereigns and issued in the 
domestic currency as transferable assets of extremely high liquidity and credit quality. Their 
advice was motivated by the fear that a differentiation between European sovereigns could 
contribute to a fragmentation of the single capital market. Moreover, in a crisis there could be 
harmful mutual contagion between credit institutions and their sovereign (EBA, 2013, p.26).  
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This EBA recommendation was taken over in the European Commission’s delegated act that 
specifies the details of the liquidity coverage ratio (European Union, 2015a). All claims on or 
guaranteed by the central government of a Member State gained level 1 status and count in 
full (without haircut) towards meeting the liquidity coverage ratio irrespective of the actual 
market situation. Furthermore, the rules state that liquid asset holdings must always be 
appropriately diversified per asset class. As another preferential treatment, sovereign-based 
assets with level 1 status enjoy an exemption from this diversification requirement. Credit 
institutions are allowed to hold them in their liquidity buffers without limit. Yet, the EU 
Treaty seeks to subject Member States’ borrowing to market discipline based on their 
individual creditworthiness. 
The oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision endorsed in January 
2013 a number of changes in the proposed liquidity rules for banks. The definition of eligible 
high-quality liquid assets was broadened with certain corporate debt securities, asset-backed 
securities and shares, subject to a higher haircut and limit. This should reduce the pressure on 
banks to hold for liquidity purposes sovereign bonds or marketable securities backed by 
governments, which in turn relaxes somewhat the close ties between banks and sovereigns. 
Following an observation period, the requirement for banks to comply with the liquidity 
coverage ratio will be phased in from 2015 to apply in full from 2019, similar to the capital 
requirements. This will give in particular the fragile banks more time to strengthen their 
balance sheets. Given the importance attached to a strong liquidity position, EU banking 
legislation set October 2015 as the starting date and a full implementation of the liquidity 
requirement already as from 2018.  
The EBA Banking Stakeholder Group (2012, p.5) expects that banks will respond by 
prioritising investments in assets defined as ‘liquid’ and give lower priority to other assets. 
Again, this is likely to raise their demand for government bonds, since these are regarded as 
liquid by definition (see also IMF, 2012). Bonner (2016) studies the behaviour of Dutch 
banks in response to a liquidity requirement already set by the national regulator which was 
similar in design to the new EU requirement. He finds for the period June 2009 to December 
2012 that Dutch banks facing a lower liquidity buffer than required indeed bought more 
government bonds shortly before the reporting day in order to comply with the national 
liquidity coverage rule.  
Buschmann and Schmaltz (2015) show the dangers of a regulation that neglects liquidity 
risks stemming from potential sovereign stress. Banks widely use sovereign bonds as 
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collateral in repurchase transactions and a negative shock from distressed government debt 
will propagate through this collateral channel and the run-off of bank liquidity may translate 
in system-wide liquidity stress. They therefore propose to raise the liquidity coverage ratio 
with an add-on for the actual liquidity risk of the sovereign assets that banks use for securing 
their repurchase transactions.      
Net stable funding ratio 
Another new element of Basel III introduced in EU banking legislation is the requirement for 
credit institutions (and systemic investment firms) to maintain a stable funding profile in 
relation to the composition and maturity of their assets and off-balance sheet activities. The 
objective is to reduce the longer-term funding risk of banks, i.e. the likelihood that 
disruptions in regular funding sources could endanger their liquidity position, which in turn 
could undermine their solvency and cause broader systemic stress. Following a reporting and 
observation period, during which a credit institution’s long-term assets had to be covered 
with a diversity of stable funding instruments, the so-called net stable funding ratio was 
expected to become a binding minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The details of the net 
stable funding ratio were however only laid down by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in October 2014 (BCBS, 2014). Following an EBA recommendation, the 
European Commission (2016) proposes to take them over in EU banking law with some 
amendments, with full application of the net stable funding requirement expected to be two 
years after the new regulation enters into force – which could be mid-2019 at the earliest.  
The BCBS defines the net stable funding ratio – which should always be equal to at least 
100% – as the available amount of stable funding relative to the required amount of stable 
funding over a one-year period. Both amounts are calibrated reflecting the stability of a 
bank’s liabilities and the liquidity of its assets. An important assumption is that 
unencumbered high-quality and liquid assets that can be securitised or traded can easily be 
used as collateral to secure additional funding or sold in the market and, therefore, do not 
need to be fully financed with stable funding. Claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns are 
regarded as extremely high-quality and liquid assets (level 1), in line with the liquidity 
coverage ratio (see above), and therefore receive a preferential treatment. The BCBS agreed 
that only 5% of their value needs to be covered by stable funding, irrespective of the actual 
credit quality and market liquidity of these assets. The European Commission (2016) 
proposal reduces this stable funding factor to 0% for central government bonds with level 1 
status in the EU liquidity coverage ratio, so as to avoid negative impacts on the liquidity of 
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national sovereign bond markets in the specific European context. This makes it even more 
attractive for banks to buy and hold sovereign bonds, as these assets make it easier for them 
to meet the net stable funding ratio than when they would invest in private securities. 
Large exposures regime 
The large exposures regime in EU banking legislation focuses on avoiding concentration risk 
arising from large asset holdings, i.e. the risk that losses vis-à-vis a given counterparty or in 
particular instruments could become so large as to threaten a bank’s solvency (see Castro and 
Mencía, 2014). To ensure adequate diversification across counterparties and assets, EU credit 
institutions and investment firms must keep their large exposures below the maximum of 
25% of eligible capital.7 This contrasts with the preferential treatment for sovereigns. As 
claims on the government (or claims carrying their guarantee) are perceived to be risk-free 
and liquid, as before, credit institutions do not face a maximum on their sovereign exposures 
(Gros, 2013; Weidmann, 2013). Still, the new EU banking rules do ask banks to put in place 
effective internal controls that address concentration risks, including those arising from large 
sovereign exposures. 
Leverage ratio 
An important new regulatory tool put forward in the Basel III framework is the 3% minimum 
leverage ratio (in terms of tier 1 capital relative to gross total asset exposure including off-
balance sheet positions), which restricts the build-up of excessive leverage in the banking 
sector and supplements the risk-based capital requirements with a non-risk based ‘backstop’ 
measure. EU banking legislation also introduced the minimum leverage ratio as a new 
prudential tool in Europe. This entailed a mandatory reporting of the leverage ratio by credit 
institutions as of January 2014, allowing a qualitative assessment to be made by national 
supervisors. This was followed by a public disclosure as of January 2015. After further 
review and calibration the European Commission (2016) proposes to follow the Basel III 
leverage ratio requirement of 3% and to make it binding two years after the new regulation 
enters into force, which as mentioned above could be mid-2019 at the earliest.  
A leverage ratio that simply relates a bank’s core capital to its non-risk weighted assets has 
the potential to counter the many uncertainties surrounding a risk-based system of capital 
requirements and, therefore, also the preferential treatment of claims on the government 
                                                          
7   To make the large exposures regime more risk sensitive, the European Commission (2016) proposes to limit the eligible 
capital to tier 1, thus excluding tier 2 capital. In addition, it introduces a lower limit of 15% for large exposures of one 
global systemically important bank to another. 
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compared to those on corporations. A bank’s sovereign exposures will be fully included in 
the assets entering the calculation of the leverage ratio, although in the EU context some 
specialised credit institutions can make particular adjustments. Public development banks 
may exclude their claims on regional governments, local authorities or public sector entities 
when these serve to finance public investments. Similarly, banks may exclude exposures 
arising from passing-through promotional loans and officially guaranteed export credits from 
the calculation base. Some credit institutions may have to adjust their portfolios in order to 
comply with the 3% minimum leverage ratio, in which case changes in public and private 
sector exposures will generally count the same and do not give rise to a funding privilege for 
governments (ESRB, 2015).  
Reducing the preferential treatment of sovereign exposures for banks 
Looking ahead, several experts have advised European authorities to reduce or eliminate the 
preferential treatment of sovereign exposures in EU prudential banking legislation, as part of 
an international agreement8 (see among others IMF, 2012; Nouy, 2012; OECD, 2014; 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015; ESRB, 2015; BIS, 2016). The main objectives would be to 
better align the regulatory treatment of credit risk and interest rate risk, remove regulatory 
distortions among asset classes, discourage large bank exposures to their own sovereign and 
improve the incentives for sound fiscal policies. For example, one could phase in 
requirements that banks apply realistic risk weights to their holdings of government debt, use 
more cautious liquidity assumptions, hold more stable funding, and/or put a limit on the size 
of their domestic government bond portfolios or on their overall exposure to European 
governments. As emphasised by Angelini et al. (2014), Castro and Mencía (2014), ESRB 
(2015), Lanotte et al. (2016), Lenarčič (2016) and BIS (2016), implementing these regulatory 
solutions raises several conceptual and practical questions.  
First, appropriate variable risk weights for sovereigns make bank balance sheets more 
immune to fiscal stress but are likely to generate pro-cyclical effects on the economy. Credit 
risk tends to rise in a downturn. This raises the amount of capital that banks would need to set 
aside for its sovereign bond holdings or it triggers sales in volatile bond markets and makes 
government funding more expensive, thereby limiting a country’s fiscal space to support the 
                                                          
8  Corresponding discussions at the European level and in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have started. To 
preserve a ‘level playing field’ for its banking sector it appears that Europe would rather wait for an international 
agreement in Basel than decide to go ahead with changing the prudential rules for sovereign exposures on its own. 
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economy. This could actually increase the incentive for governments to apply alternative 
financial repression solutions.  
Second, binding limits on government debt exposure could constrain banks in playing a role 
as contrarian investors in securities issued by their own country. In the wake of the euro area 
crisis many European banks (and other financial institutions) have substantially increased 
their holdings of domestic government debt. While this growing sovereign exposure 
increased the risky nexus between banks and their governments, their purchases helped to 
stabilise national sovereign bond markets at a time when foreign investors retreated from 
crisis-hit countries. A reduced ability of banks to play this market-supporting role could 
imply a greater likelihood that distressed euro area countries have to request funding from the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or that the ECB has to intervene in dysfunctional 
sovereign bond markets.   
Third, new rules imposing higher bank capital and liquidity buffers for sovereign risk and/or 
a maximum on sovereign exposures may impair the functioning of financial markets. While 
sovereign and corporate bonds would be treated on a more equal prudential footing and the 
banking sector would be better protected against the impact from fiscal stress, the higher 
capital and liquidity charges could hurt bank profits in the short run, reduce bank lending and 
harm the economy. Following a limit on sovereign exposures many banks also have to 
downsize their current government bond holdings. The question is whether non-banks are 
able to absorb this portfolio shift without disrupting price formation in capital markets. 
Government bonds also play a key role as collateral in repurchase transactions. Restricting 
the size of bank holdings of sovereign debt securities may therefore lead primary dealers and 
market-making banks to reduce their arbitrage activities. This would reduce bond market 
liquidity and weaken the transmission of monetary policy further along the yield curve unless 
non-banks step in to fill the void.  
Finally, the question comes up how to measure sovereign risk. Since the focus of the G20 has 
been on avoiding an undue reliance in financial regulation on the assessment by credit rating 
agencies and the ‘cliff effect’ associated with rating changes, alternative risk metrics must be 
found. Gros (2013) suggests assessing a government’s creditworthiness on the basis of its 
public deficit and debt figures and compliance with the excessive deficit procedure of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Similarly, Lanotte et al. (2016) propose developing quantitative 
indicators of fiscal sustainability to assess sovereign credit risk. 
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Given the special role of sovereign debt as ‘safe’ asset in the financial system and the 
pervasive impact of the existing preferential regulatory treatment of government bonds on 
both sovereign debtors and creditors any limitation should be carefully calibrated and allow 
for a (long) transition regime – although financial markets are likely to frontload  expected 
regulatory changes. Going beyond changing the EU legislative framework supervisors could 
also push banks to contain the risks associated with sovereign exposures, basing their 
assessments on stress tests and a range of risk metrics. In addition, they could impose more 
detailed disclosure requirements with regard to banks’ sovereign exposures. 
The preferential treatment of sovereign exposures and governments’ market access is 
moreover found in a growing body of EU financial law (see further below). Any regulatory 
attempt to reduce it would have to be coordinated at the international level, take account of 
the financial structure to avoid regulatory arbitrage and allow for a (long) period of transition 
to avoid market disruption.    
3.2 EU banking structure regulation 
The favourable regulatory treatment of sovereign debt can also be found in the proposed EU 
banking structure regulation that addresses concerns about large banks being “too-big-to-fail, 
too-big-to-save and too-complex-to-resolve”, especially at the national level (European 
Commission, 2014a). Given the threat that systemic banks pose to the stability of the 
financial system and the implicit subsidy they enjoy from a potential bail-out by the public 
sector in times of banking stress it is considered important to improve the resilience of 
important credit institutions and, if necessary, to break them up (see also ESRB, 2014).  
The European Commission (2014a) proposal of January 2014 therefore contains two key 
elements. First, it would prohibit major EU banks from carrying out proprietary trading in 
financial instruments and commodities, i.e. taking speculative positions for making a profit 
for their own account, with effect from January 2017. Second, if there is a risk of 
circumvention of this prohibition, it would give the national competent authority the power 
(or even the obligation) to require from major EU banks that they separate all high-risk 
investment activities that are not related to their traditional retail financing of the economy 
and place them in a distinct trading entity. This provision would become effective from July 
2018. The European Commission (2014a, p.2) believes this “will curtail the artificial 
expansion of banks’ balance sheets, particularly those activities of a purely speculative 
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nature, thereby reducing the risk that taxpayers have to step in to save failing banks, and 
reducing the cost and complexity of any resolution when required”.  
A notable feature of the Commission proposal is that it exempts the buying and selling of 
financial instruments issued by Member States from the ban on proprietary trading and from 
a possible separation of risky trading activities. This exemption is explicitly made consistent 
with the zero-risk treatment of bonds issued by central and regional governments (as well as 
the EU and other entities) under the EU banking legislation (as discussed above), in order to 
avoid disturbing sovereign debt markets. Again, investments in government bonds are 
assumed not to pose any credit risk to major banks and accordingly they are unrestricted in 
taking significant speculative trading positions in sovereign financial instruments, even in 
those which in the end might harm their balance sheet. While the envisaged structural reform 
of the EU banking sector would reduce the implicit public sector subsidy to large banks, it 
would extend the privileged treatment of government debt.  
The ongoing discussion of the Commission proposal in the EU Council and the European 
Parliament indicates support for including a clause in the regulation that would mandate a 
review of the exemption given to trading in government bonds so as to take account of 
possible new views on the treatment of sovereign risk at the European and international level.   
3.3 EU regulation on money market funds 
Following the heavier regulation of banks, the European Commission also set out to address 
the risks of regulatory arbitrage arising when certain banking activities could migrate towards 
the comparatively less regulated shadow banking system, including money market funds. 
Concerns focused in particular on the possible accumulation of liquidity and stability risks in 
money market funds that engage in bank-like activities, offer a return to investors in line with 
money market rates, represent a key source of short-term financing for the economy and are 
of systemic importance in the asset management sector.  
Following an invitation by the European Parliament to address these specific risks, the 
European Commission (2013d) put forward a proposal in September 2013 for an EU 
regulation on money market funds. The main objective is to introduce common standards 
across the Member States that increase the ability of money market funds to withstand 
redemption pressures in stressed market conditions and thereby protect investors, safeguard 
financial stability and preserve the integrity of the EU internal market. The common rules 
should ensure inter alia that money market funds only invest in eligible liquid assets, these 
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are of high credit quality, well diversified and subject to concentration limits, and that those 
money market funds promising their investors a constant net asset value (CNAV) hold a cash 
buffer of 3% of their assets to absorb market movements.  
The draft EU regulation on money market funds includes several provisions that create 
privileges for government debt financing. This first relates to the eligible assets in which 
money market funds are allowed to invest. The requirement that money market funds can 
only invest in specific money market instruments that have one of the two highest internal 
credit ratings does not apply to those instruments issued or guaranteed by a central authority 
or central bank of a Member State. This provision is beneficial to central governments that do 
not enjoy such a high credit standing. Furthermore, money market funds are explicitly 
allowed as part of a reverse repurchase agreement to receive non-eligible liquid transferable 
securities or money market instruments, provided these are of high credit quality and issued 
or guaranteed by a central authority or central bank of a Member State or of a third country. 
Again, central governments that do not have such a high credit standing receive a preferential 
treatment.  
Second, the provisions on the investment policies of money market funds contain derogations 
for sovereign debt, both with regard to the diversification requirements to contain the 
exposure of money market funds to counterparty risk, and the concentration limits to prevent 
that a money market fund becomes excessively important for a single issuing body. A 
competent authority may under certain conditions allow a money market fund to invest up to 
100% of its assets in different money market instruments issued or guaranteed by a central, 
regional or local authority or central bank of a Member State or the central authority or 
central bank of a third country. Similarly, no concentration limit applies in respect of the 
holdings of money market instruments issued or guaranteed by these sovereign entities. In 
short, the draft EU regulation creates considerable leeway for national competent authorities 
when assessing the mutual exposure between money market funds and sovereign entities 
issuing money market instruments.  
Third, those CNAV money market funds that concentrate their investments in debt issued or 
guaranteed by the Member States might in future be exempted from the requirement to build 
up a cash buffer against market volatility. The draft EU regulation mandates the Commission 
to evaluate the functioning of the market of sovereign-related debt in relation to the operation 
of the cash buffer during the first three years after this EU regulation has entered into force. 
Taking into account regulatory developments at the international level (that might seek to 
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change the preferential treatment of sovereign risk), it should consider the possibility of 
creating a special legal framework for money market funds with portfolios concentrated in 
government-linked debt. This provision is motivated by the specific liquidity and credit 
quality characteristics of these assets as well as the vital role that money market funds play in 
the short-term financing of the Member States. At the same time, it can be read as an attempt 
to secure a privileged access of governments to money market funds.  
Although the EU Council agreed to a stronger prudential oversight of money market funds in 
mid-2016, the draft EU regulation is still subject to agreement with the European Parliament 
and the date when it is supposed to enter into force was left open.  
4. The preferential treatment of government debt in EU investment law  
4.1 EU investment funds directive  
As regards other financial institutions than credit institutions, investment firms and money 
market funds, the EU legal provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in 
transferable securities (UCITS) must be considered. As noted by Kopf (2011), the EU 
investment funds directive – the first version of which (UCITS I) dates from December 1985 
– restricts the investment policies of collective investment funds, but offers ample scope for 
national regulators to exempt government debt from standard exposure limits that apply to 
private sector instruments.  
Already since UCITS I, collective investment funds may place up to a maximum of 35% of 
their net assets (in terms of transferable securities or money market instruments) in 
instruments issued or guaranteed by a single Member State, its local authorities, a third 
country, or a public international body to which one or more of the Member States belong. 
By way of derogation, they can even invest “in accordance with the principle of risk-
spreading” up to 100% of their assets in different transferable instruments issued or 
guaranteed by one of these government bodies, provided that this is mentioned in the fund 
rules, unit-holders have equivalent protection and securities from any single issue account for 
less than 30% of total assets.  
This legal provision compares with a standard counterparty exposure limit of 5% for this type 
of assets when they are issued by the same private sector entity (or by entities belonging to 
the same group). This ceiling may be raised to 10% under the condition that the total value of 
all such assets exposed to the same entity stays within 40% of the value of all the investment 
fund’s assets. UCITS III introduced as from February 2002 the possibility for national 
24 
 
regulators to raise the standard 5% exposure limit to 25% for covered bonds issued by a 
credit institution that invests the proceeds in assets with a high capability to cover the claims 
on these bonds on a priority basis in case of their default. The total value of such counterparty 
exposures was in this case restricted to 80% of the value of all the investment fund’s assets. 
This latter addition reduced somewhat the regulatory privilege that the UCITS directive 
bestows on sovereign issuers relative to banks issuing covered bonds.  
Allowing for very large collective investments in assets related to a single government 
appears to go beyond prudent concentration limits and the principle of risk diversification. 
This government funding privilege can nevertheless also be found in the latest edition of the 
EU investment funds directive (UCITS IV), which entered into force in December 2009 and 
took effect from July 2011 (European Union, 2009a). 
4.2 EU prudential legislation for insurance undertakings 
European institutional investors tend to have long-dated liabilities on their balance sheets 
which they seek to cover with long-term assets. Low-risk government bonds with long 
maturities are therefore an attractive instrument for these ‘buy and hold’ investors. This is 
one reason why the successive EU directives for insurance undertakings contain a preferential 
treatment of sovereign exposures, in particular by allowing national regulators to exempt 
claims on the government from standard exposure limits that apply to claims on the private 
sector (in a way similar to the UCITS directive).  
Just as for banks, the effective scope of this government funding privilege broadened 
substantially with the introduction of the euro in 1999. According to the prevailing prudential 
rules, European institutional investors had to match the currency of their assets and liabilities. 
As exchange rate risk disappeared, those domiciled in the eurozone could suddenly expand 
their domestic government bond portfolios to sovereign issuers from the whole monetary 
union.   
The EU directive for insurance undertakings known as Solvency I became law in end-2002 
and confirmed this currency matching based on the euro. While it did not set capital 
requirements, it gave Member States the freedom to introduce their own risk-based 
frameworks in national legislation. The main sovereign privilege remained that investments 
in central, regional and local government debt could be exempted from asset diversification 
requirements. Nouy (2012, p.98) observes that this exemption could be interpreted as an 
encouragement to hold government debt. At the same time, she notes that insurers were not 
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(or not anymore) constrained by law to invest in (domestic) government bonds, because this 
would amount to financial repression.  
Under the new EU insurance and reinsurance directive, Solvency II, insurance companies are 
required to value both their assets and liabilities consistent with market prices and to hold 
adequate capital against an array of risks related to their investments, the so-called Solvency 
Capital Requirement (SCR) (see European Union, 2009b). While the Solvency II directive 
was already proposed by the Commission in July 2007 and entered into force in end-2009, its 
application was postponed (twice) from January 2013 to January 2016 to take account of the 
new European supervisory architecture, in particular, the establishment of the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) as of January 2011. A new, complementary EU directive was 
needed to further detail the powers of EIOPA and ESMA (European Union, 2014).     
During this legislative process, the European Parliament (2012) argued that, given the 
sovereign debt crisis, “a zero-risk treatment for government bonds no longer corresponds 
with economic reality”. Therefore, it called in this respect for a more risk-sensitive 
calculation of the own funds that insurers would be required to hold as a buffer against 
sovereign exposures, although it cautioned that account should be taken of potentially 
destabilising effects in periods of market stress. 
The Solvency II directive specifies that the SCR may be calibrated using the standard formula 
as specified in the legislation, or an internal model approved by the national supervisory 
authority (for details see European Union, 2015b). Under the standard formula, Solvency II 
requires insurers to hold adequate capital to cover for interest rate risk and currency risk 
associated with their sovereign bond holdings. By contrast, claims on EU central 
governments issued in their own currency enjoy a capital exemption with regard to the 
market-risk related sub-modules for concentration risk (stemming either from lack of 
diversification in the assets portfolio, or from large exposure to default risk by a single issuer 
of securities or a group of related issuers) and for spread risk (i.e. the sensitivity to changes in 
level or volatility of credit spreads over the risk-free interest rate term structure).  
Solvency II further includes a similar transitional approach as the new EU banking 
legislation: until 2017 a capital exemption also applies for concentration risk and spread risk 
related to those EU sovereign exposures that are denominated and funded in any other EU 
currency than that of the issuing country, while afterwards this preferential treatment is 
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phased out. As from 2020 in these cases the standard model’s computation based on credit 
quality must be applied. Given the fact that euro area countries share the same currency, 
insurance companies in the eurozone can by default apply a zero capital charge for 
concentration risk and spread risk related to all EMU sovereign exposures denominated and 
funded in the euro.  
Many larger insurance groups are instead applying their internal models to compute the SCR 
and therefore have to make more accurate assumptions regarding the sovereign risks in their 
portfolio and ensure an appropriate amount of capital to cover for them. Still, as noted by the 
ESRB (2015), they might receive approval from their national supervisors to use the same 
preferential assumptions for EU sovereign exposures as in the standard formula in order to 
maintain a level playing field among insurers. Comparing the biased assumptions under the 
standard formula with more realistic partial internal model calculations of sovereign credit 
risks, Gatzert and Martin (2012) conclude that the degree of underestimation of the SCR 
depends on the credit quality of the government bonds and is especially severe for lower-
rated sovereigns.  
Höring (2013) conducts a review of the literature on the impact of Solvency II on the 
investment portfolios of insurance companies. He finds many studies expecting a reallocation 
to less capital-intensive assets and a greater appetite for EU sovereign bonds issued in 
domestic currency, in particular lower-rated government debt. Düll et al. (2015) confirm this 
anticipated response and document a bias towards investing in domestic government bonds 
for 17 large European insurance companies based on data for the period 2009:Q4 to 2013:Q1. 
They further show that market expectations of the default risk of insurance companies are 
positively correlated with the riskiness of their sovereign bond portfolios. This finding would 
justify introducing a capital buffer against sovereign exposure to absorb potential losses. 
Solvency II also enhances governance and risk management and explicitly asks insurance 
companies to conduct an adequate own risk and solvency assessment, even in those cases 
where the standard formula for the calculation of credit risk allows them to consider EU 
government bonds as risk-free. This assessment acquires special importance, since all assets 
including sovereign bonds are to be valued at market prices and insurers are therefore well-
advised to account for the credit risk of their counterparties, also those related to 
governments.  
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4.3 EU prudential legislation for occupational pension funds 
A European prudential legislative framework for occupational pension funds was established 
in 2003 with the EU directive on the activities and supervision of Institutions for 
Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP). Member States were given discretion on the 
precise investment rules that they wanted to impose at the national level: they could be made 
more stringent, but could also entail a preferential treatment of government debt. Similar to 
Solvency I, national regulators could decide to exempt investments in government bonds 
from diversification requirements, thereby offering occupational pension funds the 
opportunity – if not an incentive – to create a substantial exposure to sovereign risk. 
However, Member States could not require them to invest in domestic government bonds, 
whereas this had been quite common in the past.      
After the introduction of Solvency II, to ensure a level playing field with insurance 
undertakings offering pension products, the European Commission (2010b) suggested that 
also occupational pension funds should hold a sufficient capital buffer. Originally, the 
Commission planned to extend the preferential treatment of government exposures in 
Solvency II to the new solvency requirement for occupational pension funds to be introduced 
in a recast of the IORP directive (IORP II). Following critical comments from stakeholders, 
however, it decided in May 2013 to defer the introduction of a harmonised solvency rule for 
occupational pension funds. The IORP II directive that was agreed in mid-2016 instead 
focuses inter alia on improving risk management and enhancing information for pension 
scheme members.  
As shown by Amzallag et al. (2014), imposing a minimum solvency requirement could lead 
occupational pension funds to rebalance their portfolios in favour of low-risk assets, 
including government bonds. The authors also report that already the announcement of the 
possible introduction of a new solvency rule caused some de-risking of pension fund 
portfolios towards fixed-income instruments. 
5. The preferential treatment of government debt in EU market law 
5.1 EU market infrastructure regulation  
Following a G20 agreement, EU legislation has also been implemented to increase the 
transparency of over-the-counter (OTC) derivate contracts such as credit default swaps, 
reduce the uncertainty about the risks involved in derivate transactions, protect against 
market abuse, and thereby allay the related financial stability concerns. The European Market 
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Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) of August 2012 (European Union, 2012b) requires 1) the 
reporting of all derivate contracts to trade repositories, making them accessible to supervisory 
authorities; 2) the clearing of all standardised OTC derivate contracts through a central 
counterparty and liquid, high-quality collateral assets to be posted by the parties to both 
centrally and non-centrally cleared derivative contracts; and 3) the implementation of 
stringent organisational, business conduct and prudential rules for the central counterparties.  
EU public bodies and central banks charged with intervening in the management of public 
debt are excluded from the scope of this regulation “in order to avoid limiting their power to 
perform their tasks of common interest” (European Union, 2012b, p.6). For reasons of 
international coherence and consistency, the same exemption is being extended to public 
bodies and central banks outside the EU to the extent that these enjoy a similar treatment in 
their national legislation (European Commission, 2013c).  
EMIR in this respect avoids any interference in the operation of independent central banks 
using government securities for the conduct of monetary policy in derivative markets. Placing 
the activities of public debt management offices in sovereign securities markets on one line 
with those of central banks, because these must be coordinated for efficiency reasons (see 
European Commission, 2013c, p.12), appears to assume that the two public bodies still are 
(or should be) closely intertwined. This may reflect the intention to maintain a level playing 
field with the legal situation for these public bodies in other G20 jurisdictions.  
EMIR will lead to more clearing via central counterparties. A central counterparty can only 
accept highly liquid collateral with minimal credit and market risk to cover the initial and 
ongoing exposure to its clearing members. The legal provisions and regulatory technical 
standards specify the types of collateral that could be considered highly liquid, i.e. cash, 
financial instruments, bank guarantees and gold (see ECB, 2013). For financial instruments to 
qualify, they should normally be debt instruments issued or explicitly guaranteed by a 
government, a central bank or a supranational institution.  
EMIR also defines a framework for determining valuation haircuts and collateral 
concentration limits to limit the exposure. Central counterparties are required to establish 
prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and that take into 
account stressed market conditions. Some of them impose minimum credit rating standards 
for the acceptance of collateral assets. The concentration limits differ across the various 
arrangements. For example, they may set a maximum for a certain rating per category of 
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collateral in the basket, or set a limit on the share of certain issuers (such as regional 
governments) of the assets in the collateral basket.  
As explained by Levels and Capel (2012) and Houben and Slingenberg (2013), EMIR will 
raise the net demand for high-quality, liquid collateral assets, including sovereign bonds. This 
may contribute to easing government funding constraints, especially as the additional demand 
for this type of assets due to EMIR and other EU legislation (as discussed above) is structural 
and exceeds the growth in supply.      
As regards the prudential rules applicable to central counterparties, the European 
Commission has issued regulatory technical standards to ensure that they are at all times safe 
and sound and hold sufficient capital against a range of risks (except those risks stemming 
from clearing activities that are largely covered by specific financial resources). Since these 
risks are similar to those of credit institutions and investment firms, the capital standards in 
EU prudential banking legislation serve as the relevant benchmark. For credit risk, the 
standardised approach must be applied, indicating that the preferential treatment of sovereign 
exposures in the banking sector (as discussed above) is extended to central counterparties. 
5.2 EU regulation on credit rating agencies 
Credit rating agencies provide an important service to the market: by rating debt instruments 
they help to reduce information asymmetries that exist between borrowers and lenders. 
However, since the financial crisis they have come under severe criticism for having 
underestimated the credit risks associated with structured financial products. They have also 
received critical comments for downgrading distressed euro area countries, even after these 
had just committed to serious policy adjustments that improved their fundamental outlook. 
Eijffinger (2012) concludes in this respect that rating agencies generally lagged behind 
markets in their judgement.  
Following the financial crisis, three EU regulations affecting the operations of credit rating 
agencies in Europe have been adopted. Those registered in the EU were first placed under 
stricter authorisation requirements and new rules of conduct applicable in full from December 
2010. A subsequent amendment of the regulation brought them under exclusive supervision 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) as from July 2011 (European 
Union, 2011). Further EU legislation in force since June 2013 seeks to reinforce the 
independence of credit rating agencies, enhance the transparency and quality of credit ratings, 
reduce the risk of over-reliance on external credit ratings, limit the high degree of 
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concentration in the rating market, and control the risks associated with the business model of 
rating agencies. In addition, it introduces a right of redress for investors in and issuers of 
financial instruments (European Union, 2013a,b). For a legal and economic analysis see de 
Haan and Amtenbrink (2012).  
This new EU legislation also made credit rating agencies subject to specific requirements for 
sovereign ratings. They have to publish annually at the end of December a calendar for the 
next 12 months setting two or three dates for issuing unsolicited sovereign ratings and rating 
outlooks, from which they can only deviate for legal reasons. Sovereign ratings must be 
accompanied by detailed research reports explaining the assumptions, perceived risks and 
other key elements on which they are based. While specific national policies may constitute 
one of these elements, rating agencies are to refrain from giving policy recommendations to a 
country. Governments are also given more time (a full working day instead of just 12 hours) 
to react to a change in their credit rating before this is made public, so that they can better 
verify the underlying data, which must have been taken from generally accessible sources. 
When a rating agency breaches the obligations, it may be held liable for damages caused 
intentionally or with gross negligence.  
Commission staff also examined the policy option of granting ESMA the power to restrict or 
ban temporarily the issuance of sovereign debt ratings (see European Commission, 2011b, 
p.34). This could become relevant, in particular, when exceptional events could trigger 
contagion and excessive market volatility or when complete information on timing, amount 
and conditions of an international support programme to stabilise the economy of a troubled 
country was still missing. The study also considered the option of a permanent prohibition of 
sovereign credit ratings (see European Commission, 2011b, p.34). For clearly defined 
exceptional circumstances a temporary suspension was regarded as an acceptable 
precautionary measure of last resort, although its effectiveness was probably limited. By 
contrast, a permanent prohibition was in conflict with the fundamental freedom to conduct a 
business and the principle of proportionality. None of these repressive policy options were in 
the end seriously considered, as ‘shooting the messenger’ for the bad news on a country’s 
credit standing was no solution to the underlying fiscal problem.   
While there are legitimate concerns with how credit rating agencies operate, the impression is 
that policy-makers want to ‘punish’ them for unduly downgrading euro area sovereigns. 
During 2012-2014 the credit rating agencies were in any case more conservative in their 
credit risk assessment of crisis-affected euro area countries than before the sovereign debt 
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crisis (de Vries and de Haan, 2016). This greater caution may be due to the stricter EU 
legislation, the supervision by ESMA, or reflect a deliberate strategy of credit rating agencies 
to regain their reputation.  
Whatever the explanation, a more conservative rating will only have a limited impact on the 
incentives of policy-makers, as long as market views reflected in sovereign bond yields and 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads are more favourable than credit ratings. On balance, any 
government funding advantage resulting from the EU’s tightening of oversight of rating 
agencies and imposing rules for issuing sovereign credit ratings is likely to be moderate. The 
potential benefits in times of liquidity stress may be partially outweighed by the recent 
tendency among rating agencies to under-rate the weaker countries participating in EMU 
compared to their OECD peers.  
5.3 EU regulation on short-selling and credit default swaps  
Speculators are another typical target in times of market stress. As the financial crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis intensified, several euro area countries introduced emergency measures 
to counter excessive speculation by announcing a temporary restriction or ban on short-
selling in certain market segments. Short-selling is the practise of investors to sell borrowed 
securities (including sovereign bonds) with the intention to cover their positions later by 
repurchasing them at a lower price. This draws concern from regulators, as short-selling is 
seen to artificially drive prices to lower levels and spur market volatility during a crisis. Also 
attempts by investors to protect themselves against losses on sovereign debt by purchasing 
credit default swaps (CDS) are sometimes associated with higher government bond yields. In 
particular, uncovered (naked) short-selling and buying of sovereign CDS is often seen as 
contributing to negative price spirals and disorderly markets.9  
A new EU regulation (European Union, 2012a) harmonised with effect from November 2012 
the rules for short-selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps and conferred powers of 
coordination and intervention on the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).10 
The common regulatory framework gave national competent authorities the possibility to 
prevent short sales during periods of market stress, introduced a reporting requirement for net 
short positions above specific thresholds for European shares and sovereign bonds, restricted 
                                                          
9  On 8 June 2010, the French President and the German Chancellor sent a joint letter to the President of the European 
Commission asking the Commission to come forward with a legal proposal to ban naked short-selling and naked 
sovereign CDS purchases.   
10  The European Court of Justice confirmed in January 2014 that the ESMA has its own discretionary powers to adopt 
emergency measures on the financial markets of the Member States in order to regulate or prohibit short selling in the 
pursuit of the EU objective of financial stability. 
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uncovered short-selling of shares and debt instruments and prohibited uncovered sovereign 
credit default swap positions in view of their speculative nature. A safeguard clause allows 
the national competent authorities to suspend the regulation temporarily if the restrictions on 
sovereign credit default swaps were found to lead to a significant decline in the liquidity of 
the sovereign debt market. With regard to hedging, market making activities in general and 
operations of primary dealers in sovereign debt are exempted from the new requirements.  
Arguably, uncovered positions pose a danger of settlement failure and market disruption and 
should be restricted or banned. However, short-selling also supports market efficiency in 
terms of liquidity, risk allocation and price formation. As argued by the public debt managers 
of OECD countries (Blommestein, 2010), the ability to manage risk through short-selling 
operations supports a better functioning of both primary and secondary markets for sovereign 
instruments. A restriction of uncovered short-selling of government bonds could lead 
investors to demand a higher risk premium and increase borrowing costs.  
Also the new legal requirement that only investors who actually hold EU government bonds 
(or meaningfully correlated private sector instruments) are allowed to buy protection against 
sovereign default could reduce market volumes (IMF, 2013). Trades in sovereign credit 
default swaps will become dependent on investors that are willing to buy the underlying 
government bonds and wish to hedge against the risk of losses. As a result, more speculative 
traders would have to turn to unrestricted proxy markets (for example, using futures contracts 
on sovereign debt or CDS contracts on financial firms that are correlated with a country’s 
credit risk) to place their bets on European sovereigns. This could have the unintended effect 
of causing dislocations in these other markets and undermining financial stability. A reduced 
liquidity in the market for sovereign debt protection would moreover raise the costs of 
hedging and could drive up the costs of sovereign debt issuance.  
Overall, this EU regulation may be seen as a constraining or even preventing market 
participants from expressing a negative view on the creditworthiness of sovereigns, i.e. 
another example of “messenger shot, message not” (The Economist, 2012, p.64). Already in 
the run-up to the date of its introduction, the unwinding of net short positions in sovereign 
debt reportedly contributed to a decline in government bond yields. The longer-term impact 
of the short-selling restrictions may, however, be a higher cost of government funding 
(Blommestein, 2010). In addition, the IMF (2013) observed that the phasing out of all 
uncovered positions in European sovereign credit default swaps coincided with a material 
decline in spreads and reduced market liquidity, although other factors may also have played 
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a role. A first review by the ESMA (2013a,b) noticed a slight decrease in Member States’ 
sovereign CDS spreads after the introduction of the prohibition on uncovered sovereign CDS 
transactions. The liquidity of EU sovereign CDS markets was in general not adversely 
affected, although CDS markets for specific Eastern European countries experienced a 
significant deterioration. The CDS indices on groups of EU sovereigns (the purchase of 
which now requires investors to hold the underlying bonds of all countries in the index) saw a 
significant decline in liquidity. 
5.4 European financial transactions tax 
There have also been many calls by politicians to counter excessive market activity and 
stabilise financial markets by establishing a tax on financial assets or transactions. In the 
wake of the financial crisis it is gaining popularity as an instrument to discourage socially 
unproductive financial transactions, recoup some of the public funds spent on bailing out the 
banking sector, or to fill bank resolution and deposit insurance funds (IMF, 2010; Botsch, 
2012; Burman et al., 2016; Hemmelgarn et al., 2016). Many Member States have already put 
in place specific taxes on financial operations and/or have recently introduced their own 
system of bank levies, in particular, to fill bank resolution funds (European Commission, 
2013b; Devereux et al., 2015). Given open capital markets, however, their effectiveness will 
depend on all European financial centres or EMU countries joining in. 
Following a request from the European Parliament, the European Commission (2011a) put 
forward a proposal for an EU-wide tax on financial transactions. The main objectives were to 
counter excessive market activity, contribute to avoiding future financial crises and ensure 
that financial institutions (also compared to other sectors) make a fair and substantial 
contribution to covering the fiscal costs of the crisis. The initiative was also meant to avoid 
that the single market for financial services gets fragmented by uncoordinated national 
indirect taxation of financial transactions.  
As many Member States were opposed to such a uniform tax, the European Commission 
(2013a) proposed instead the introduction in January 2014 of a common financial 
transactions tax in 11 euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia) that had expressed their willingness 
to go ahead with this tax under the so-called enhanced cooperation procedure (see also 
Hemmelgarn et al., 2016).11 The harmonised tax regime would be applied at each stage of a 
                                                          
11  France and Italy had introduced their own financial transaction taxes in 2012 and 2013, respectively, while Belgium and 
Greece already had such a tax in place.  
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financial transaction and through each financial intermediary, covering secondary-market 
transactions in shares, bonds and derivatives, while excluding primary market activity. Also 
transactions undertaken for the purposes of monetary policy, public debt management and 
some international public policies would be exempted, as well as foreign exchange trading in 
the spot market (to preserve the free movement of capital) and day-to-day financial 
transactions of households and firms. Further provisions aimed to avoid tax evasion, 
distortions and transfers to other jurisdictions. 
Some of the participating euro area countries have indicated the wish to exclude trade in 
government debt securities from the scope of the financial transaction tax.12 This would, 
however, create an arbitrary cost advantage for secondary market purchases of public sector 
debt compared to alternative financial instruments and is a typical example of financial 
repression to favour governments. As a transitory alternative option, the European Parliament 
(2013) suggested to limit the tax rate on government bond transactions to only half of the 
standard rate until 1 January 2017. Additionally, it proposed to apply that reduced tax rate 
until the same date to all financial trades by pension funds. Other policy-makers have 
suggested to exempt pension funds altogether from the financial transaction tax in order to 
avoid that pensioners will get hit by the higher costs of trading (Botsch, 2012). As pension 
funds typically invest a large part of their reserves in government paper and are regular 
traders in public sector bonds, this would also be a convenient way for countries to ensure a 
more liquid government bond market with lower trading costs than for other financial 
instruments. Advocates of an encompassing financial transaction tax counter that it could 
nudge asset managers further towards ‘productive’ longer-term investment strategies and that 
pensioners would also benefit from the broader effect of more stable financial markets (Gray 
et al., 2012).  
Acknowledging the need for further technical work the participating euro area countries 
committed in May 2014 to implement the harmonised financial transactions tax in a 
progressive manner. As a first step, they planned to start with the taxation of shares and some 
derivatives on 1 January 2016, allowing each further step towards full implementation to take 
due account of the economic impact. A negative impact on the real economy and on pension 
schemes was to be minimised. As both public sector and private sector debt securities would 
not be part of the tax base, the extent of the implied sovereign privilege would be more 
limited than in the initial proposal. Regarding derivatives, it was agreed that the tax rate 
                                                          
12  See European Commission (2013b) for a discussion of alternative options for the scope of this tax. 
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should be low but based on the widest possible tax base, without impacting the cost of 
sovereign borrowing. This suggests that derivative contracts for sovereign bonds might be 
(temporarily) exempted from the tax. By June 2016, politicians could still not agree on the 
final modalities of the financial transactions tax and its introduction was (again) postponed, to 
end-2016. Estonia stepped out, as it expected the costs to be higher than the benefits. 
6. Conclusions 
The overhaul of European financial governance addresses several weaknesses that have come 
to the fore in the wake of the financial crisis. Some elements in this reform signal a revival of 
market access privileges for governments, also under cover of prudential considerations.  
First, the tightening of EU financial sector regulation and supervision aims to ensure that 
financial institutions hold adequate capital and liquidity buffers and concentrate on providing 
long-term lending to the economy rather than engaging in speculative activities. This reflects 
widespread concerns about the insufficient resilience of financial institutions to adverse 
shocks, the risks involved in derivate transactions and the state having to bail out ‘too-big-to-
fail’ systemic banks. At the same time, most government securities continue to be valued as 
‘high quality’ and ‘liquid’ assets carrying zero risk by definition, while they are also 
exempted from large exposure limits. This preferential treatment of sovereign compared to 
private debt instruments can be found in a growing number of EU financial laws and fully 
exploits the opening in the EU Treaty that gives governments a privileged funding access to 
financial institutions for prudential reasons. EMU countries benefit the most from this 
privilege, since euro area financial institutions can generally place their funds in the euro-
denominated bonds of any eurozone member country without having to weigh the associated 
credit, liquidity or concentration risks. Many observers have called upon regulators to put an 
end to these government funding privileges in prudential legislation, or at least to limit them, 
given moral hazard on the part of sovereigns, financial stability concerns, and the risk of 
crowding out private creditors.  
Second, new EU financial market regulations related to short-selling, credit default swaps and 
credit rating agencies seek to make the financial system less speculative, less short-termist 
and less volatile. At the same time, these regulatory measures may be interpreted as aiming to 
ringfence governments against heightened market pressure. Similarly, the scope of the 
proposed common financial transactions tax to curb speculative trading might be calibrated to 
exclude trade in government securities. This would establish a tax-based funding privilege for 
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the participating euro area countries. The preferential treatment of sovereigns in EU market 
regulation and taxation could be of particular value in times of high and volatile interest rates, 
when markets speculate about their solvency, their credit ratings are downgraded, their bonds 
could face short-selling pressures and investors wish to buy default protection. Yet, it is 
unlikely to be successful in silencing the market’s voice of concern about derailing fiscal 
positions, especially in the case of debt-ridden euro area countries.  
Altogether, the overhaul of European financial governance represents a shift from relatively 
lenient market rules to more intrusive market regulation. This transition also entails a 
growing number of government privileges in finance which constrain the effectiveness of 
capital markets in ensuring fiscal discipline – notably where they help countries with less 
solid public finances to secure their short-term funding needs and keep interest rates at 
affordable levels by being able to draw on a more captive investor base. The growing scope 
of market access privileges for (in particular euro area) governments, as facilitated and 
legislated at the European level, may be interpreted as the reappearance of financial 
repression in a modern prudential guise aimed at reducing the burden of high public debt, as a 
return to the traditional close relationship between the government and the financial industry 
so as to align mutual interests in fiscal and financial stability, or as a way to increase explicit 
and implicit taxes on finance and recoup public revenues lost during the financial crisis.  
The obvious argument against such a wide and growing array of funding privileges is that it 
reduces market discipline and creates moral hazard on the part of sovereigns, promoting a 
bias towards debt-financed public spending and postponing economic reforms, especially for 
euro area countries. Governments are likely to become complacent, knowing that they are 
protected from market pressure. Countering these adverse incentives heavily relies on the 
success of a strict application of the reinforced EU economic governance framework and the 
effectiveness of peer pressure for ensuring sustainable public finances. Moreover, a 
regulatory bias towards large sovereign exposures in European financial law may turn into an 
economic and prudential concern, given the potential crowding out of private funding and the 
risks for financial stability in times of fiscal stress.  
As the discussion in this paper demonstrates, the preferential treatment of sovereign 
exposures and governments’ market access is found in a growing body of EU financial law. 
Any regulatory attempt to reduce it would therefore have to take account of the financial 
structure to avoid regulatory arbitrage and necessitate a carefully crafted approach at the 
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Annex Table - Preferential treatment of government debt in European financial law
EU financial legislation Nature of government funding privilege Market participants affected Direct benefits to governments Status 30.11.2016
1. EU banking regulation/directive (CRR/CRD IV) EU banking sector In force since July 2013;
     to transpose Basel III phased in 2014-2019
     a) Capital adequacy requirements EU sovereigns in domestic currency risk free, Privileged access to banks Applies since Basel II;
but phased out for non-domestic EU currencies phased out 2018-2020
          EBA capital exercise Temporary capital buffer against sovereign risk Offsets privileged access to banks Applied Dec 2011-Dec 2014
     b) Liquidity coverage ratio/diversification rule EU sovereigns highest liquidity and credit quality Privileged access to banks Phased in 2015-2018
     c) Net stable funding ratio EU sovereigns highest liquidity and credit quality Privileged access to banks May fully apply in mid-2019
     d) Large exposures regime Exempts EU sovereign bonds, but Privileged access to banks, Applies since CRD,
sovereign concentration risk a bank issue counters privileged access to banks based on CRD IV
     e) Leverage ratio Focus on total non-risk weighted assets Counters privileged access to banks May fully apply in mid-2019
2. EU banking structure regulation EU too-big-to-fail banking sector COM (2014) proposal
     a) Ban on proprietary trading  Exempts EU government securities Privileged access to banks
     b) Separation of high-risk investment activities Exempts EU government securities Privileged access to banks
3. EU regulation on money market funds EU money market funds COM (2013) proposal
     a) Restriction to highest quality eligible assets Exempts sovereign money market instruments Privileged access to money market funds
     b) Portfolio diversification rules Exempts sovereign money market instruments Privileged access to money market funds
     c) Portfolio concentration limits Exempts sovereign money market instruments Privileged access to money market funds
     d) Cash buffer for CNAV money market funds Possible future exemption of  sovereign debt Privileged access to money market funds
4. EU investment funds directive (UCITS IV) EU investment funds Applies from July 2011
     a) Large exposures regime Allows much higher limits for government bodies, Privileged access to investment funds,
a higher limit also for protected assets from banks reduces extent of govt. privilege
5. EU directive for insurance undertakings (Solvency II) EU insurance sector Solvency I in force; II from 2016
     a) Asset diversification requirement Allows to exempt sovereign bonds Privileged access to insurers Applies under Solvency I
     b) Capital requirements for market risk Exemptions for concentration risk and spread risk Privileged access to insurers Applies under Solvency II
related to EU sovereigns in domestic currency, 
but phased out for non-domestic EU currencies phased out 2018-2020
     c) Own risk and solvency assessment All assets (incl. sovereign bonds) to be valued Counters privileged access to insurers Applies from 2016
at market prices, prudent person principle
6. EU directive for occupational pension funds (IORP II) EU occupational pension funds IORP I in force; II deferred
     a) Asset diversification requirement Allows to exempt sovereign bonds Privileged access to pension funds Applies under IORP I
     b) Capital requirements As Solvency II Privileged access to pension funds Suggestion for IORP II, deferred 
7. EU market infrastructure regulation (EMIR) EU central counterparties/derivative traders In force since Aug 2012
     a) Mandatory central clearing of OTC derivates Exemption for official public debt management Privileged access to derivates traders
     b) Only high quality liquid collateral Favours high-quality sovereign bonds  Privileged access to derivates traders
     c) Capital requirements for central counterparties Capital exposure to EU sovereigns risk free, Privileged access to central counterparties
but phased out for non-euro area EU sovereigns
8. EU regulation on credit rating agencies Affects timing of sovereign ratings Credit rating agencies operating in EU Reduced market volatility In force since June 2013
9. EU regulation on short-selling and CDS contracts Places restrictions on uncovered short-selling Financial market traders in EU Reduced market volatility In force since Nov. 2012
and bans uncovered sovereign CDS positions
10. Common financial transactions tax (FTT)
     a) EU-wide financial transactions tax Curbs trading in all financial instruments Financial market traders in EU EU and national budget revenues Rejected
     b) Common financial transactions tax Curbs trading in all financial instruments except Financial market traders in 11 EA ctrs. National budget revenues,  COM (2013) proposal
          under enhanced cooperation primary issuance and public debt management (excluding Estonia) likely exemption of govt. securities, May 2014 political commitment
possible exemption of pension funds
1st step: shares and some derivates 1st step envisaged in end-2016
